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1 Introduction
Dating back to at least Mandeville’s popular Fable of the Bees (Mandeville , 1714[1988],
I, remark Q), the paradox of thrift became a central proposition in Macroeconomics after
the publication of Keynes’s General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. It is also a
distinguishing feature of the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution, where it appears
both in a short- and in a long-run version. It states that an increase in the saving rate
produces a reduction of production and capacity utilization in the short-run, and of the
growth rate in the long-run. A remarkable feature of this result is its robustness against the
specification of the investment function, a controversial issue in Kaleckian economics.
We investigate the validity of the paradox of thrift in the two-sector version of the Kaleckian
growth model. To the purpose, we consider an economy with one consumption and one
investment good, and differential sectoral mark-ups. We show that the paradox of thrift
is confirmed in both level and growth versions when investment is a function of (average)
capacity utilization or the profit rate. However, when the investment function depends
on both aggregate capacity utilization and on the aggregate profit share, that is when the
Bhaduri-Marglin investment function (Bhaduri and Marglin , 1990; Marglin and Bhaduri ,
1990) is adopted, the paradox of thrift in its growth version may fail if mark-ups are higher
in the investment good sector. In this case, the reduction in the saving rate produces a
reallocation of economic activity towards the investment good sector; the aggregate profit
share rises and its positive effect on investment may offset the reduction in average capacity
utilization.
The analysis is based on the standard Kaleckian mark-up pricing assumption, where sectoral
mark-ups are exogenous and independent of each other. We show, however, that analogous
results can be obtained if firms set prices by targeting a specific return rate when capacity
utilization is at its normal level; this alternative assumption is important since it captures a
2
possible dependence of the consumption good sector mark-up on the one in the investment
good sector.
First developed in seminal contributions by Dutt (1988, 1990); Park (1995); Dutt (1997a);
Lavoie and Ramirez-Gaston (1997); Franke (2000), the two-sectors Keynesian-Kaleckian
model growth and distribution is experiencing a recent revival. Kim and Lavoie (2017)
have studied the convergence between the actual and the normal rates of capacity utiliza-
tion; Fujita (2018) has considered the growth implication of shocks to sectoral mark-ups;
Murakami (2018) has analyzed the effect of sectoral interactions on business cycles in a Key-
nesian model; Nishi (2019) has introduced sectoral endogenous labor productivity growth,
and analyzed its effects on cyclical demand, growth and distribution; Beqiraj et al. (2019)
have studied how changes in consumers’ preferences and the saving rate may affect income
distribution through changes in the composition of output. None of these contributions,
however, investigate the paradox of thrift in the two-sector Kaleckian model when accumu-
lation is based on the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and states the
theoretical results. Section 3 generalizes the main result of the paper when firms adopt
target-return, rather than mark-up, pricing. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks while
the most tedious proofs can be found in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 Production and technology
The economy consists of a consumption (C) and an investment (I) good. Output in both
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sectors (Xi) is produced through a sector-specific Leontief production function:
Xi = min[uiBiKi, AiLi], i = C, I (1)
where B and A are capital and labor productivities, K is the capital stock, L is employment,
and u ≤ 1 is the degree of capacity utilization. When u = 1,output is at its full capacity
level (Xp). Capital does not depreciate. Profit maximization ensures:
Xi = uiBiKi = AiLi. (2)
We normalize capital productivities Bi = 1.
2.2 Society and saving assumptions
There are two classes in society. Capitalists earn profits on the capital stock they own. They
save the share s > 0 of their income. Workers earn the wage rate w, uniform across sectors,
and do not save.
2.3 Mark-up prices
In standard Kaleckian fashion, firms set prices by charging an exogenous sector-specific
constant mark-up (zi) over unit labor cost. If we let pi be the price of good i, and we
choose the consumption good as the numeraire we have pC = 1 = (1 + zC)w/AC and
pI = (1 + zI)w/AI . Accordingly
w =
AC
1 + zC
, (3)
pI =
1 + zI
1 + zC
AC
AI
=
1 + zI
1 + zC
γ, (4)
where γ ≡ AC/AI , is the labor productivity ratio. We define the relative price as p ≡
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pI/pC = pI .
2.4 Value added distribution
In each sector, value added is distributed as wages and profits to labor and capital employed
in production. If we let ri be the interest rate in sector i we have piXi = wLi + ripIKi,
which, after using (2), (3), (4) and rearranging, yields
rC =
zC
1 + zI
1
γ
uC , (5)
and
rI =
zI
1 + zI
uI . (6)
2.5 Output uses
We distinguish consumption depending on its income source. We denote consumption out
of wages as Cw, and consumption out of profits as Cpi, so that
XC = C
w + Cpi. (7)
Investment good output is fully absorbed in the accumulation of capital. If we let g be the
growth rate of the aggregate capital stock we have
XI = gK. (8)
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2.6 Balanced growth under alternative closures
There are two possible consistent specifications of the two-sector Kaleckian growth model
(see Park (1995) and Dutt (1997a) for a discussion). The first version of the model assumes
that capital instantaneously moves between sectors to equate sectoral profit rates; in this
framework, sectoral capital stocks (KC and KI ) are not state variables and we can only
specify aggregate investment and the growth rate, rather than the sectoral ones. In fact,
KC and KI are defined only after profit rates are equalized. In the second version of the
model, there is no sectoral capital mobility in the short run, so that KC and KI are given
and known before firms’ investment decision; we can specify sectoral investment and growth
rates, and profit rates will not be equalized unless by a fluke. We investigate the functioning
of the paradox of thrift under the first version of the model.
Since workers do not save, the whole wage fund is spent as consumption out of wages. Using
(2) we have
Cw = w(LC + LI) = w
(
uCKC
AC
+
uIKI
AI
)
.
Hence, substituting for the wage rate from (3) yields
Cw =
AC
1 + zC
(
uCKC
AC
+
uIKI
AI
)
=
1
1 + zC
(uCKC + γuIKI) . (9)
On the other hand, capitalists’ propensity to consume out of profits is (1− s). Accordingly
Cpi = (1− s) (rIpKI + rCpKC) ,
which, using (4),(5) and (6) implies
Cpi =
1− s
1 + zC
(zCuCKC + zIγuIKI) .
Once we know consumption out of wages and profits, we can use equation (7) to find
XC =
1
1 + zC
(uCKC(1 + (1− s)zC) + γuIKI(1 + (1− s)zI)) .
Define δ ≡ KC/K ∈ (0, 1) as the share of the capital stock employed in the consumption
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good sector. Dividing both sides of the previous equation by K and rearranging yields
δuC = (1− δ)uIγ
(1 + (1− s)zI)
szC
≡ (1− δ)uIγΓ(s), (10)
with Γ′(s) < 0. Let us now turn to the equilibrium in the investment sector. Using factors
demands found in (2), and dividing both sides of equation (8) by K, we find
uI(1− δ) = g. (11)
Next, we impose the equalization of profit rates across sectors, so that
rC = rI = r. (12)
Using (5) and (6), the equalization yields:
uC = γ
zI
zC
uI . (13)
We close the model with three alternative investment functions that generalize to the two-
sector case the standard assumptions of one-sector Kaleckian growth model, where invest-
ment depends either on the rate of capacity utilization, on the profit rate, on the profit share
or on some combination of them. We have already mentioned that the instantaneous profit
rates equalization implies that sectoral capital stocks are not state variables, and that only
aggregate investment and growth can be defined. This hypothesis also implies that firms will
have to look at average, rather than sectoral, utilization rates, profit rates and profit shares
when making their investment decision. In fact, only once profit rates are equalized, given
total investment, they do know what share of the capital stock and investment is employed
in either sector.
If we let the average degree of capacity utilization in the economy be u¯, and the aggregate
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profit share be pi, we take into account the following investment functions:
• the first one extends to the two-sector case the early Kaleckian models that had ca-
pacity utilization as determinant of investment (Amadeo , 1986a; Dutt , 1997b)
g1 = g(u¯); (14)
• the second one assumes investment to depend on the profit rate, the ’stagnationist’
investment function (Taylor , 1985; Amadeo , 1986b)
g2 = g(r); (15)
• the third one generalizes the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function (Bhaduri and Mar-
glin , 1990; Marglin and Bhaduri , 1990) by positing that growth depends on both
aggregate capacity utilization and profit share
g3 = g(u¯, pi). (16)
Under the first and third specifications, the model consists of four equations, (10),(11), (13),
and either (14) or (16), for the four unknowns δ, uI , uC , g. When the investment function is
(15), the unknowns are δ, uI , uC , r, g in the five equations (10), (11), (12), (13), and (15). In
all three cases we can plug (13) into (10) to find the equilibrium share of capital employed
in the consumption goods sector1
δ∗(s) =
Γ(s)
Γ(s) + zI/zC
∈ (0, 1). (17)
1In what follows, we will denote with x∗ the balanced growth value of variable x.
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The aggregate profit share, that is the ratio between the value of total profits and value
added, is also independent on the investment function adopted. Its balanced growth value
is
pi∗(s) =
rCpKC + rIpKI
XC + pXI
=
rp
δuC + (1− δ)puI
=
=
zI
(1− δ) ((1 + zC) Γ(s) + 1 + zI)
=
zCΓ(s) + zI
(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)
, (18)
where we used (2), (4), (5), (6), (10), (12) and (17). Inspection of (18) shows that pi∗ is
economically meaningful being bounded between zero and one. It is a function of sectoral
mark-ups and the saving rate.
We can state:
Proposition 1. an increase in the saving rate raises the equilibrium profit share if and only
if zI > zC .
Proof. pi′(s) = dds
(
zCΓ(s)+zI
(1+zC)Γ(s)+(1+zI)
)
= Γ
′(s)(zC−zI)
((1+zC)Γ(s)+(1+zI))
2 > 0⇔ zI > zC .
A rise in the saving rate reduces capitalists’ consumption, so that the composition of output
changes in favor of the investment sector. If mark-ups are higher in the investment rather
than in the consumption sector (zI > zC), the reallocation generates a rise in the aggregate
profit share.
Our next step is to verify whether the paradox of thrift holds under the alternative invest-
ment functions we have proposed. In order to obtain closed-form solutions for the growth
rate, and in line with most of the Kaleckian tradition, we assume linear functional forms.
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Let us start with the accelerator version of investment:
g1 = β0 + β1u¯, (19)
where
u¯ =
XC + pXI
pK
=
1 + zI
1 + zC
uCδ
γ
+ uI(1− δ).
We can use (10) to find:
u¯ =
XC + pXI
pK
= uI(1− δ)
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
. (20)
Hence, using (11),
uI(1− δ) = g = (21)
= β0 + β1uI(1− δ)
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
,
which, by factoring uI(1− δ), solves for the steady state growth rate of the first model as a
function of the saving rate
g∗1(s) =
β0
1− β1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
) . (22)
Since Γ′(s) < 0, the growth rate is a negative function of the saving rate and the paradox
of thrift holds in its growth version. From (11) and (20) we can write aggregate capacity
utilization as
u¯∗1(s) = g
∗
1
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
. (23)
It is the product of two negative functions of the saving rate so that the paradox of thrift
in its level form also holds.
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The second investment function makes investment dependent on the profit rate:
g2 = λ0 + λ1r. (24)
Hence,
uI(1− δ) = g = (25)
= λ0 + λ1
zI
1 + zI
uI ,
and, by factorizing uI , using (17) and rearranging
g∗2(s) =
λ0
zI/zC
Γ(s)+zI/zC
zI/zC
Γ(s)+zI/zC
− λ1
zI
1+zI
. (26)
We show in the Appendix (section 5.1) that dg∗2/ds < 0. The paradox of thrift in its growth
version is confirmed also under the second type of investment function. Similarly to (23),
we can find the aggregate utilization rate as
u¯∗2(s) = g
∗
2(s)
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
,
so that, given dg∗2/ds < 0 and Γ
′(s) < 0, the paradox of thrift in level form also holds.
We now turn to the main result of our paper, and we investigate how growth responds
to changes in the saving rate under a Bhaduri-Marglin investment function. In linearized
terms, we can specify the function as
g3 = µ0 + µ1u¯(s) + µ2pi(s). (27)
Hence,
uI(1− δ) = g = (28)
= µ0 + µ1uI(1− δ)
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
+ µ2pi(s),
and
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g∗3(s) =
µ0 + µ2pi(s)
1− µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
) . (29)
We are now able to state:
Proposition 2. an increase in the saving rate raises the growth rate if and only if zI > zC
and µ2µ1 >
1
zI−zC
1+zI
1+zC
µ0+µ2pi(s)
1−µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s)+1
) ((1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI))2.
Proof. see Appendix (section 5.2).
A rise in the saving rate has two opposing effects on growth. On the one hand, there
is the standard depressing effect due to the reduction in capitalists’ consumption and, in
turn, in aggregate demand and capacity utilization. On the other hand, though, the higher
propensity to save entails a shift in the composition of output away from consumption goods.
When the profit share is higher in the investment goods sector, the aggregate profit share
rises thus producing a positive incentive to invest. When investment is sufficiently more
sensitive to profitability than to economic activity, that is when µ2/µ1 is ’high enough’, the
paradox of thrift in its growth version fails.
This mechanism can be better understood by focusing on the function Γ(s). In fact, the
propensity to save only enters the system through Γ(s). First, notice that from (2) Li =
uiKi/Ai, so that LC/LI = uCKCAI/ [uIKIAC ]= δuC/ [(1− δ)uIγ] . Next, (10) shows that
Γ(s) = δuC/ [(1− δ)uIγ] = LC/LI , that is Γ(s) equals the employment ratio in the two
sectors. Therefore, a rise in the saving rate raises employment and output in the investment
sector relative to the consumption one. The change in the composition of output towards
the sector with the highest mark-up raises the aggregate profit share (our Proposition 1).
Second, Γ(s) enters the definition of aggregate capacity utilization through (20). A higher
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propensity to save reduces capitalists’ consumption, thus depressing the aggregate capacity
utilization. The negative shock to capacity utilization tends to depress the equilibrium
growth rate; this effect can only be offset if investment reacts to the profit share as assumed
in the Bhaduri-Marglin investment function (our Proposition 2).
It is not obvious that in this setting aggregate capacity utilization u¯∗3(s) = g
∗
3(s)
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
declines with the propensity to save. In principle, when the paradox of thrift in its growth
version is violated, the positive effect on growth could offset the negative effect on con-
sumption and produce an overall rise in utilization. However, it turns out that the negative
consumption effect uniformly dominates the (possibly positive) growth effect, so that the
paradox on thrift in the level form always holds. We prove this result in the Appendix
(section 5.2).
3 A Generalization: the Model with Target-Return Pricing
We developed our results under the standard mark-up pricing assumption that characterizes
one- and two-sector Kaleckian growth models. The assumption, however, is controversial.
According to Steedman (1992), mark-up pricing is problematic in that it does not take into
account input-output relations. This critique would be particularly relevant for our two-
sector model: since the investment good is a basic good, the mark-up in the consumption
sector cannot be taken as exogenous and independent of the mark-up in the investment
sector.
Without entering this discussion, we show that the logic of our main result is robust to a
generalization of the model that does not suffer from the critique. To the purpose, we adopt
the target-return pricing assumption that Lavoie and Ramirez-Gaston (1997) have applied
to the two-sector Kaleckian model in order to take the interdependence between mark-ups
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into account. As we are about to show, under this different priceing rule mark-ups are not
exogenous variables anymore.
Let us start by introducing the sectoral normal degree of capacity utilization, uni . Next,
we define the sectoral target rate of return (rni ) as the return rate that firms target when
output and sales correspond to the normal degree of capacity utilization, that is when
Xi = u
n
iKi ≡ X
n
i . Given the target rate and normal output, the normal flow of profits (Π
n
i )
can be written both as Πni = zi(w/Ai)X
n
i and Π
n
i = r
n
i pKi = r
n
i pX
n
i /u
n
i . The equalization
of the two profit flows expressions, while using (3) and (4), yields
zi = r
n
i pAi/(wu
n
i ) = r
n
i (1 + zI)Ai/(AIu
n
i ). (30)
Equation (30) shows that mark-ups in the investment good sector, i.e. the basic good sector,
depend only on its own econonomic features:
zI =
rnI /u
n
I
1− rnI /u
n
I
=
rnI
unI − r
n
I
. (31)
On the contrary, mark-ups in the consumption good sector are affected by the fundamentals
of both sectors:
zC =
rnC
unC
γ(1 + zI) = γ
rnC
unC
unI
unI − r
n
I
. (32)
Now, in our exercise we only consider a saving shock. No changes to mark-ups are analyzed
and, in turn, the interdepence between the two sectors’ mark-ups never comes into play. We
can, however, substitute (31) and (32) into (18) to find the aggegate wage share as
pi∗(s) =
γ
rnC
unC
unI
unI −r
n
I
Γ˜(s) +
rnI
unI −r
n
I
(1 + γ
rnC
unC
unI
unI −r
n
I
)Γ˜(s) + 1 +
rnI
unI −r
n
I
,
where Γ˜(s) =
1+(1−s)rnI /(u
n
I −r
n
I )
sγrnCu
n
I /[u
n
C(u
n
I −r
n
I )]
. We can now restate Proposition 1 as
Proposition 3. an increase in the saving rate raises the equilibrium profit share if and only
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if
rnI
unI
> γ
rnC
unC
.
Proof. Notice first that Γ˜′(s) < 0. Then, pi′(s) =
Γ˜′(s)(γ
rnC
un
C
unI
un
I
−rn
I
−
rnI
un
I
−rn
I
)(
(1+γ
rn
C
un
C
un
I
un
I
−rn
I
)Γ˜(s)+
rn
I
un
I
−rn
I
)2 > 0 ⇔ rnIunI >
γ
rnC
unC
.
In order to interpret the emended condition for the positive relation between the saving rate
and the profit share, let us define the sectoral normal profit shares as pini ≡ Π
n
i /X
n
i = r
n
i p/u
n
i .
We can see that the condition found in Proposition 3 is equivalent to pinI > γpi
n
C , or AIpi
n
I >
ACpi
n
C . We thus see that the necessary condition for the violation of the paradox of thrift
requires that the normal profit share (weighted by labor productivity) in the investment
good sector be higher than in the consumption sector. In order to produce a rise in the
profit share, the rise in the saving rate must be associated to a reallocation of resources
towards the relatively more profitable sector. From a qualitative point of view, the result
confirms what found without target-return pricing.
Once the possibility that pi′(s) < 0 is established, it will always be possible to find a threshold
for the relative weights of the profit share and capacity utilization in the investment function
(µ2/µ1) such that the paradox of thrift is violated. With respect to the result found in
Proposition 2, the threshold will be a function of γ, rnC , u
n
C , u
n
I and r
n
I rather than zC and
zI ; but the economic content will be analogous.
4 Conclusions
Our theoretical note shows that the paradox of thrift may not work in the Kaleckian growth
and distribution framework, once it is generalized to a two-sector economy. This possibility
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arises because the saving rate affects not only the level of aggregate demand, but also its
composition. In particular, a rise in the saving rate, besides depressing aggregate demand,
shifts the sectoral composition of output towards the investment goods sector. If this sector
is characterized by relatively high mark-ups the aggregate profit share rises; and such an
increase in profitability may have a positive effect on growth if, as assumed in Bhaduri and
Marglin (1990) and Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), investment reacts to the profit share.
The actual relevance of our result should be established empirically. We have provided
testable conditions on sectoral mark-ups and on the sensitivity of investment to demand
conditions and profitability. Investigating this matter is left for future research.
5 Appendix
5.1 The paradox of thrift in the stagnationist version of the model
From (26) we have dg∗2/ds =
λ0λ1(
zI/zC
Γ(s)+zI/zC
−λ1
zI
1+zI
)2 zI1+zI (zI/zC)Γ
′(s)
(Γ′(s)+zI/zC)
2 < 0.
5.2 The paradox of thrift in the Bhaduri-Marglin model
Let 1− µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
≡ D0, from (29)
dg∗3/ds =
1
D20
[
µ2pi
′(s)
(
1− µ1
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
))
+ µ1
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ′(s) (µ0 + µ2pi(s))
]
.
Therefore
sign (dg∗3/ds) = sign
[
µ2pi
′(s)
(
1− µ1
(
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ(s) + 1
))
+ µ1
1 + zI
1 + zC
Γ′(s) (µ0 + µ2pi(s))
]
.
Then, dg∗3/ds > 0⇔
µ2
µ1
> −
1+zI
1+zC
Γ′(s)(µ0+µ2pi(s))
pi′(s)
(
1−µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s)+1
)) = 1zI−zC 1+zI1+zC µ0+µ2pi(s)1−µ1( 1+zI1+zC Γ(s)+1
) ((1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI))2 .
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Let us now turn to the utilization rate. Given u¯∗3(s) =
µ0+µ2pi(s)
1−µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s)+1
) ( 1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
=
=
µ0+µ2
zCΓ(s)+zI
(1+zC )Γ(s)+(1+zI )
1−µ1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s)+1
) ( 1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
, let D1 = (1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI). Then, du¯
∗
3/ds =
µ2Γ′(s)(zC−zI)
D0D21
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
+
+ 1+zI1+zC Γ
′(s)µ0[(1+zC)Γ(s)+(1+zI)]+µ2(zCΓ(s)+zI)
D20D1
=
= − Γ
′(s)
D0D1
{
µ2(zI−zC)
D1
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
+
−
1+zI
1+zC
[µ0 [(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)] + µ2(zCΓ(s) + zI)] /D0
}
.Hence, du¯∗3/ds < 0⇔ µ2(zI−
zC)
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
D0 <
1+zI
1+zC
[[(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)] [(1 + µ0) + µ2(zCΓ(s) + zI)]] . SinceD0 < 1 and µ2zI
(
1+zI
1+zC
Γ(s) + 1
)
<
µ2(zCΓ(s) + zI)
1+zI
1+zC
[(1 + zC)Γ(s) + (1 + zI)] ,then du¯
∗
3/ds < 0 always.
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